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In 2009, the H1 N1  pandemic strain of influenza serv ed as
a dramatic wake-up call for biosurv eillance experts
around the world. Despite major adv ances in domestic
and global surv eillance capabilities, H1 N1  was spreading
rapidly  across the United States long before a v accine
could be dev eloped, tested, and mass-produced in time to
slow the pandemic. Today , the threats posed by  the H7 N9
influenza v irus and the MERS (Middle East Respiratory
Sy ndrome) Coronav irus are a significant concern to
global health officials. Although it is far from clear how
these two v iruses are transmitted, it seems likely  that animal-to-human spread
could be play ing a role in the ev olution of one or both of the v iruses.
That supposition should not be a surprise to any one who knows the sheer
number of zoonotic threats on a comprehensiv e list of the newly  emerging (or
re-emerging) infectious diseases. Giv en what was observ ed with the rapid
introduction of H1 N1  to humans and the subsequent unchecked spread of the
disease, a closer and more detailed understanding of the existing strengths and
weaknesses of global and domestic surv eillance sy stems may  be the key  to
impeding the spread of these and other emerging zoonotic threats – rabies, for
example, is a disease that can easily  be transmitted from animals to humans.
Animal Surveillance Systems in the United States
Within the United States, surv eillance programs for infectious diseases are
spread across a div erse array  of federal, state, and local agencies. Departments
of health usually  focus their greatest attention on human diseases;
departments of agriculture giv e primary  attention, though, to animals
commonly  classified as liv estock; and departments of natural resources or
wildlife are responsible for the tracking and surv eillance of non-domesticated
and wild animals.
These understandably  different priorities lead to some significant intrinsic
breaks in continuity . In June 201 0, the U.S. Gov ernment Accountability  Office
published an analy sis of the federal gov ernment’s own biosurv eillance sy stems
and found that the div erse array  of programs assigned to v arious departments
suffered from a sev ere lack of ov erarching leadership and complicated national
strategic planning. As a follow-up, the White House published a National
Strategy  for Biosurv eillance in July  201 2 and, a few months later (Nov ember
201 2), a National Biosurv eillance Integration Center Strategic Plan for the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  (DHS). The implementation of these
new strategies is ongoing, so progress in the field of integrated biosurv eillance
will likely  be an area of increasing scrutiny  ov er the coming y ears.
Ev en within the animal surv eillance sy stem itself, a div erse array  of data
sources must be more closely  aligned to prov ide an accurate nationwide
understanding of zoonotic diseases. The National Animal Health Surv eillance
Sy stem (NAHSS) serv es as an integrated framework for the federal and state as
well as univ ersity  and industry -based entities to collect, collate, and rev iew
animal health data throughout the United States.
 Most people
understand the
need for a strong
national-defense
program capable
of defeating any
likely adversary.
Very few, though,
recognize and/or
are prepared to
counter the
potentially
devastating effects
of a global
pandemic.
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The ov erarching goal of the NAHSS is multi-pronged. First, the program seeks
to serv e as an early  detection and global surv eillance sy stem for both foreign
animal and newly  emerging diseases. Second, the NAHSS serv es as a data
collection sy stem for existing “program diseases” and, in that respect, will help
researchers understand the current status, the potential impact of v arious
interv entions, and/or changes in the dy namics of such diseases. Finally ,
NAHSS helps to monitor animal sy stems for diseases of high impact on both
production and the nation’s food markets.
Here it should be pointed out that the NAHSS has made significant progress in
recent y ears and, among other things, has standardized the data collection
processes used by  all 50 states. Howev er, work continues on the dev elopment of
a U.S. National List of Reportable Animal Diseases, where the goal is to make
the National List of Reportable Animal Diseases aligned with the international
efforts of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).
The Influence of Pandemic Influenza on Domestic Surveillance
The growing threat posed by  a pandemic influenza, particularly  Highly
Pathogenic Av ian Influenza (HPAI), has driv en the enhanced domestic
surv eillance of non-human animals. The Veterinary  Serv ices unit of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Serv ice aims to partner with a broad spectrum of state and industry
organizations to monitor and test the nation’s domestic poultry  and swine
populations to ensure that foreign influenza strains are constantly  observ ed.
This enhanced surv eillance effort has been significant, according to the USDA,
which reports that more than a combined 47 8,000 tests were conducted
during the fourth quarter of 201 2 and first quarter of 201 3.
The USDA also is working activ ely  to prev ent the establishment of domestic
reserv oirs of HPAI. To begin with, the United States does not allow the
importation of liv e birds, eggs, or hatchlings from countries where av ian
influenzas, such as the nov el H7 N9 strain, are prev alent. Products based on
those ty pes of poultry  may  be imported only  if they  are treated in a manner
that would hav e destroy ed the v irus. Pet birds also are routinely  tested before
importation. The USDA’s work in this area, combined with heightened border
and port security , has been v ery  effectiv e in prev enting the introduction of any
HPAI strains of particular concern.
Unfortunately , as the 2009-201 0 H1 N1  pandemic seems to indicate, there is
still room for improv ement in the U.S. domestic surv eillance of influenza,
particularly  in the swine population. Pigs are often an important intermediary
between av ian influenza and human-adapted strains. The H1 N1  pandemic
highlighted this risk. In the case of the 2009-201 0 pandemic strain of H1 N1 ,
the ancestors of the v irus had been tracked in pigs for sev eral y ears, but a series
of non-anticipated ev olutionary  changes led to the new strain. Prev enting new
outbreaks is a particularly  difficult challenge in an env ironment in which
thousands of nov el av ian and swine influenza sequences are identified ev ery
y ear.
The constant struggle is not simply  to identify  new strains of a particular
disease in animals, but to determine which of the new strains poses an
abnormally  high risk to humans and/or other animals. This is an area where
considerable work will be needed to reach a point of more effectiv e interv ention,
if ev er such a state could be achiev ed. Nonetheless, the effort must be made. In
May  2009, for example, in its response to the 2009 H1 N1  pandemic, the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prev ention called for “more sy stematic
surv eillance of influenza v iruses in pigs.”
International Systems of Surveillance: A Complex Network
Many  diseases that threaten U.S. liv estock originate ov erseas, particularly  in
nations where population densities, agricultural practices, and surv eillance
mechanisms differ significantly  from U.S. domestic standards. Like most other
international security  measures, the methodical surv eillance of diseases of any
ty pe is subject to local capabilities – and v ulnerable to them as well, if the
capabilities are limited. Largely  for that reason, standards v ary  between
locations, leav ing participants in the international food trade sy stem
susceptible to exposure. Recognizing this problem, international agencies hav e
dev eloped rigorous surv eillance and response guidelines to detect and at least
ameliorate these international food safety  v ulnerabilities.
Perhaps of greater importance are the international community ’s cooperativ e
efforts between and among different agencies. In April 201 0, in recognition of
the growing threat posed by  foodborne diseases, OIE, the Food and Agriculture
7/25/2014 Article Detail - Domestic Preparedness
http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Medical_Response/Public_Health/Early_Detection_of_Zoonotic_Emerging_Infectious_Diseases/ 3/4
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and the World Health Organization
(WHO) dev eloped a collaborativ e strategy  spelling out their different, but
complementary , missions in disease control and prev ention. That strategy
div ides responsibilities along the v arious agencies’ areas of expertise and, where
responsibilities ov erlap, encourages the free exchange of information.
One product of the FAO/OIE/WHO tripartite agreement, the Global Early
Warning Sy stem (GLEWS), jointly  consolidates epidemiological data for use by
other international agencies, national authorities, nongov ernmental
organizations, and the global public. The extensiv e GLEWS database of disease
ev ents tracks the incidences of animal disease, including zoonoses, across the
world, maintaining a lev el of situational awareness on all fronts. With some 7 0
HPAI incidents monitored by  the FAO from July  2009 to January  201 2, it is
obv ious that GLEWS already  has improv ed the interagency  mobilization
needed to v erify  instances of v arious diseases. Although pandemics hav e
certainly  threatened both animal and human populations in the past, the FAO
also noted that HPAI was the first pandemic to arriv e with adv ance warning –
thanks largely  to the dev elopment and use of improv ed surv eillance methods.
Responding to calls for international emergency  responses, in addition to
surv eillance efforts, the OIE-FAO’s Crisis Management Center-Animal Health
(CMC-AH) was established to prov ide additional help to local agencies in the
form of technical assistance. The CMC-AH, housed in the FAO’s Rome
headquarters, uses adv anced surv eillance technology  to facilitate international
responses to HPAI and other disease threats. Resource mobilization is needed in
some cases, but the CMC-AH acts primarily  in an adv isory  role to local
authorities. The international response to HPAI is nearly  unprecedented in its
scope. Most of the CMC-AH’s activ ation calls to combat the spread of HPAI
during the 2006-2008 time frame were issued because the organization was
monitoring the disease around the clock in 1 3  endemic countries.
The cooperation between and among the FAO, OIE, and WHO has prov ided
significant multi-sectorial protection against foodborne diseases. By  merging
their operational tools, professional expertise, and material resources (when
applicable), these international organizations hav e prev ented effort
redundancies and multiplied the effectiv eness of their surv eillance and
interv ention actions.
As the threat of HPAI looms, the U.S. public health experts inv olv ed would be
well adv ised to seek new methods to improv e and expand national foodborne
disease surv eillance and interv ention capabilities. The U.S. Department of
Health and Human Serv ices, the USDA, and other federal departments also
should continue to foster additional collaboration not only  among their own
agencies but also with international partners. The consolidation of parallel
efforts to detect, research, and treat foodborne diseases lends itself to greatly
increased national food security  actions.
Lessons to Be Learned: Improving Domestic Surveillance
One of the more important lessons to be learned from recent threats to global
health is the ov erarching truth that zoonoses now constitute a major threat to
all nations throughout the world. Although recognition of that fact certainly
exists in the U.S. animal-surv eillance community  and among public health
officials, many  segments of the human public health infrastructure are almost
wholly  div orced from their animal surv eillance counterparts in other agencies.
Moreov er, many  do not participate in the joint information-sharing processes
necessary  to inform their global partners about the broad spectrum of new
potential threats looming just ov er the horizon.
One model that may  serv e public health well is the dev elopment of fusion
center-like collaborations with animal surv eillance counterparts. Fusion
centers allow for interdisciplinary  information sharing and situational
awareness, principally  in the law enforcement and homeland security  sectors,
but it was their efforts to obliterate certain silos that produced improv ed
understanding among critical partners.
In summary , the global animal surv eillance community  has mov ed into the
collaboration business principally  due to the necessity  produced by  div ergent
national surv eillance programs. Domestic surv eillance sy stems would be well
serv ed to further improv e that same multi-agency  integration. Hopefully ,
recent efforts at the federal lev el to consolidate surv eillance efforts and prov ide
more centralized leadership will ev entually  lead to adoption of sev eral
additional changes in collaboration that are still needed.
________________________
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